Nedarim 87 - January 20, 27 Tevet

Today's daf is sponsored by Gordon Marx in honor of Sara Marx’s Hebrew birthday. “Happy birthday!” If the Mishna teaches us that one needs to know exactly whose vow he is nullifying from the verse in the Torah saying "her", why when it comes to a mourner, a braita rules that tearing clothing for a relative, if the tearing is done with the wrong person in mind, it is valid, even though it is learned from a verse "for Shaul and for Yonatan" which would seem to also indicate the need one to know for whom they are tearing. Two different answers are brought to resolve the contradiction between the Mishna and the braita. The first answer is to distinguish between a case (the braita) where one did it generally or was told generally about a relative and then intended when tearing for the wrong person, and a case (our Mishna) where one was told or did the action specifically for a particular person and it turns out it was the wrong person. The second answer is that in the braita, he realized the mistake within a few seconds (toch k'dei dibur) and therefore it was valid and the Mishna was in a case where he realized his error beyond that short time frame. A braita is brought to support each response. If one forbade two things in one vow, if the husband/father ratifies part, the whole thing is ratified. But if he nullified only part, neither part is nullified. The Gemara explains that the Mishna goes according to Rabbi Yishmael and then brings Rabbi Akiva and the rabbi's positions who each disagree with Rabbi Yishmael and with each other. From where do they each derive their opinions? If one didn't know that he could nullify his wife's/daughter's vows, even if he heard the vow earlier, he can nullify it on the day he learns that he can nullify it. But if he knew he could nullify but not that it was a vow that needed to be/could be nullified, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether he can/cannot nullify it later when he discovers that. Rabbi Meir's opinion here contradicts his opinion regarding a blind accidental murderer who is punished by having to go to a refuge city even though his knowledge was only partial, whereas, in our Mishna, Rabbi Meir agrees with the rabbis in the first case and considered partial knowledge only partial.