Auctions with Kshitij Kulkarni, Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Tarun

In this week's episode Anna Rose and Tarun Chitra explore the topic of auctions with guests Kshitij Kulkarni, PHD student at Berkeley’s EECS department and Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science at Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. They discuss the history of auctions, both in the real world and in blockchain, and go on to cover more recent blockchain uses, such as MEV and NFT auctions. They review the incentives of both auction holders and the participants as well as how this incentive design can influence the effectiveness of the auctions themselves. Here are some additional links for this episode:Credibility and Incentives in Gradual Dutch Auctions by Kulkarni, Ferreira and ChitraCredible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains by Kulkarni, Ferreira and Chitra Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake by Kulkarni, Ferreira and ChitraCredible Auctions: A Trilemma by Akbarpour and LiCredible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments by Ferreira and Weinberg Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions by Essaidi, Ferreira and Weinberg Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market by Ferreira, Moroz, Parkes and Stern Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness by Ferreira and Weinberg Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake by Ferreira, Hahn, Weinberg, Yu Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules by Ferreira and Parkes https://jumpcrypto.com/thepit/zkweek/ Find out more about zkSummit9 here: zksummit.com.Apply for ZK Hack Lisbon here: ZK Hack application Aleo is a new Layer-1 blockchain that achieves the programmability of Ethereum, the privacy of Zcash, and the scalability of a rollup.Interested in building private applications? Check out Aleo’s...